Truthier Than Thou: Truth, Supertruth and Probability of
Truth
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Different formal tools are useful for different purposes.
For example, when it comes to modelling degrees of belief,
probability theory is a better tool than classical logic;
when it comes to modelling the truth of mathematical claims,
classical logic is a better tool than probability theory.
In this paper I focus on a widely used formal tool and argue
that it does not provide a good model of a phenomenon of
which many think it does provide a good model: I shall argue
that while supervaluationism may provide a model of
probability of truth, or of assertability, it cannot provide
a good model of truth -- supertruth cannot be truth. The
core of the argument is that an adequate model of truth must
render certain connectives truth-functional (at least in
certain circumstances) -- and supervaluationism does not do
so (in those circumstances).